EXHIBIT(S) - s1 completes record - completes record Possible SSN Administratively Redacted November 30, 2017 (2024)

Case

Td Bank, N.A. v. Asimina Doukas

Aug 07, 2024 |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Non-Card) Transaction |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Non-Card) Transaction |EF2024-657

Case

Indian Ridge Accounting, Llc v. Wendy Akroyd D/B/A ARTEMESIA, LLC

Aug 08, 2024 |Commercial - Contract |Commercial - Contract |EF2024-662

Case

Wells Fargo Bank Na v. Steven R Rochford AKA, Steven Rochford AKA, Laura Rochford, Municipal Credit Union

Jul 12, 2017 |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |Real Property - Mortgage Foreclosure - Residential |EF2017-574

Case

Capital One, N.A. Successor By Merger To Capital One Bank (Usa), N.A. v. Darlene P Humes

Aug 14, 2024 |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Card) Original Creditor Plaintiff |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Card) Original Creditor Plaintiff |EF2024-685

Case

Erin Starr v. John David Allen

Aug 07, 2024 |Matrimonial - Contested |Matrimonial - Contested |EF2024-652

Case

The Bank Of Greene County v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, National Association

Aug 07, 2024 |Sharon Graff |Commercial - UCC |Commercial - UCC |EF2024-654

Case

Lvnv Funding Llc v. Pete Velonis

Aug 16, 2024 |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Card) Debt Buyer Plaintiff |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Card) Debt Buyer Plaintiff |EF2024-690

Case

Sunmark Credit Union formerly known as Sunmark Federal Credit Union v. John Jennings

Aug 08, 2024 |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Non-Card) Transaction |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Non-Card) Transaction |EF2024-659

Case

Citibank, N.A. v. Michael Svetik

Aug 08, 2024 |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Card) Original Creditor Plaintiff |Other Matters - Consumer Credit (Card) Original Creditor Plaintiff |EF2024-664

Ruling

Haynes vs. Oasis Fun Center, Inc.

Aug 12, 2024 |23CV-0203093

HAYNES VS. OASIS FUN CENTER, INC.Case Number: 23CV-0203093This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’sorder dated May 21, 2024. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trialno later than February 25, 2025. Both sides have posted jury fees. The parties are ordered to meet and conferregarding trial dates and to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates.

Ruling

WIGGINS, JOSHUA vs COLEMAN, TIMOTHY

Aug 14, 2024 |CV-23-004326

CV-23-004326 – WIGGINS, JOSHUA vs COLEMAN, TIMOTHY – Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Deposition Responses – DENIED.Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege was waived with respect to the form of the deponent’s counsel’s objections to the subject deposition questions. Counsel’s discussion on the record demonstrates that the nature of the privileges being asserted was known and understood by Plaintiff’s counsel at the time the objections were offered. (See, e.g., People v. Rios (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1139.)The Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish a factual basis for application of the exception to the attorney-client privilege in Evid. Code § 956. Lastly, Plaintiff has provided no authority for his claim that the party-admission exception to the hearsay rule permits an invasion into privileged communications in this context.

Ruling

CORNELIUS MURPHY ET AL VS. 3M COMPANY ET AL

Aug 13, 2024 |CGC23277169

(Part 2 of 2) (Tentative ruling continued from previous entry.) 9. A further case management conference is set for October 15, 2024, at 1:30 p.m. a. Case management conference statements are not required. b. Parties may appear at the conference by zoom. c. If the parties agree that no CMC is necessary, they shall notify the Court at least two court days before the hearing. 10. Plaintiffs will send a settlement demand to Defendants no later than October 21, 2024. Response to the settlement demand is due November 5, 2024. The parties shall separately submit confidential settlement demands/offers. This confidential value must be separately submitted to Department503@sftc.org via electronic mail on November 12, 2024. 11. A mandatory settlement conference is set for Thursday, November 21, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 503. Personal appearance is required by all unless a party is excused for good cause. A request to excuse a personal appearance must be submitted to Department503@sftc.org two weeks before the mandatory settlement conference. The prevailing party shall lodge with the clerk in Department 301 by the time set for this hearing a proposed order repeating verbatim the substantive portion of the tentative ruling. Any party wishing to contest the tentative ruling must email contestasbestostr@sftc.org by 4:00 p.m. on the day before the hearing and state their intention to contest. If a hearing is requested, it will be on August 13, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. Attorneys may appear in person or remotely. Face coverings are optional. Remote appearances must be arranged through CourtCall (1-888-88-COURT). No prior notice or permission is required. If a party wishes to have the matter reported, the parties must meet and confer to agree on only one court reporter, who must be licensed under Bus. & Prof. Code, sec. 8016. There will be only one official record. If the parties cannot agree, the Court will designate a qualified court reporter to provide the official transcript for the matter, and the party or parties will bear the cost. = (301/RCE)

Ruling

ROCHA, FERNANDO vs TRUJILLO, DIANA LISBBETH HERNANDEZ

Aug 16, 2024 |CV-22-002302

CV-22-002302 – ROCHA, FERNANDO vs TRUJILLO, DIANA LISBBETH HERNANDEZ – Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Compelling Further Verified Responses from Defendant Ontrac to Special Interrogatories, Set Two; Request for Sanctions – GRANTED, in part, DENIED, in part.The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to further responses to its Special Interrogatories Set Two, Nos. 2 to 6 and that the objections raised by Defendant to same are without merit. (Civ. Proc Code § 2017.010; Civ. Proc. Code § 2030.240).Further, claims of attorney client privilege or protected work product privilege require the production of sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.240) Defendant made bare assertions of said privileges without supporting them with sufficient factual information or a privilege log.The Court also frowns upon Defendant’s Counsel’s conduct in making repeated assertions and undertakings to Plaintiff’s Counsel that supplementary responses were forthcoming, only to oppose this motion without any regard or reference to said assertions and undertakings.Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is granted. Defendant is hereby ordered to produce Code- compliant verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Nos. 2-6 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order.Objections based on work product or attorney client privilege shall be supported by a privilege log.Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is denied for failure to notice his request for monetary sanctions and the party against whom said sanctions are sought. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990), 223 Cal.App.3d 1429; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 311(a); Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, 6; O'Brien v. Cseh, 148 Cal.App. 3d 957, at p. 961

Ruling

JEFFREY ITO VS USC DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Aug 16, 2024 |23STCV17350

Case Number: 23STCV17350 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING JEFFREY ITO, vs. USC DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY. Case No.: 23STCV17350 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Defendant University of Southern Californias demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Jeffrey Itos Complaint is denied as moot. Defendants unopposed motion to strike is denied as moot. Defendant University of Southern California [erroneously sued as USC Department of Public Safety] (USC) (Defendant) demurs to pro per Plaintiff Jeffrey Itos (Ito) (Plaintiff) complaint (Complaint). (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2; C.C.P. §430.10(e).) Defendant also moves unopposed to strike portions of Plaintiffs Complaint. (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§435, 436.) 1. Demurrer Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41, emphasis added.) Defendants counsel declares that on June 7, 2024, she sent a letter via email to Plaintiff in an effort to meet and confer. (Decl. of Hogoboom ¶5, Exh. B.) Defendants counsel declares Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants meet and confer correspondence. (Decl. of Hogoboom ¶7.) Defendant is in violation of C.C.P. §430.41 because it did not attempt to meet and confer with Plaintiff in person, by telephone, or by video conference. However, failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants demurrer. Background Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on July 25, 2023. On January 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (FAC) against Defendant. Defendant filed the instant demurrer to the initial Complaint on January 12, 2024. Plaintiff filed his opposition on August 5, 2024. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed. Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Discussion Defendants demurrer to the initial Complaint is denied as moot because the operative pleading is the FAC, filed on January 26, 2024. Conclusion Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint is denied as moot. Moving Party to give notice. 2. Motion to Strike In light of this Courts ruling on the demurrer, Defendants unopposed motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs Complaint is denied as moot. Dated: August _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

JAN SALAMUDIN VS STEPHANIE SANTIAGO

Aug 13, 2024 |23CHCV01481

Case Number: 23CHCV01481 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: F43 Dept. F43 Date: 8-13-24 Case #23CHCV01481, Jan Salamudin vs. Stephanie Santiago Trial Date: N/A MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL MOVING PARTY: Attorney for Plaintiff Jan Salamudin RESPONDING PARTY: No response has been filed. RELIEF REQUESTED Attorney for Plaintiff is requesting to be relieved as counsel. RULING: Motion to be relieved as counsel is denied. Matthew C. Mullhofer of Law Offices of Matthew C. Mullhofer, counsel of record for Plaintiff Jan Salamudin, seeks to be relieved as counsel for that party.¿However, counsel did not file the motion with the required Forms MC-051, MC-052, and MC-053. Therefore, the motion fails on a procedural basis. Motion to be relieved as counsel is denied without prejudice. Counsel should refile on the correct forms. Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

GARY MICHELSON, AN INDIVIDUAL VS CONQUEST GENERAL BUILDING CONTRACTORS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 12, 2024 |24STCV06087

Case Number: 24STCV06087 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 Dept: 55 Case Name: Gary Michelson v. Conquest General Building Contractors Inc., et al. Nature of Proceedings: Demurrer Tentative Ruling: The demurrer filed by Conquest General Building Contractors, Inc., and James Michael Korkunis is OVERRULED. A. BACKGROUND Factual and Procedural Background On March 12, 2024, Dr. Gary Michelson (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint alleging six causes of action against Conquest General Building Contractors Inc. (Conquest) and James Michael Korkunis (individually referred to herein after as Korkunis, collectively referred to as Defendants). The six cause of action are: 1. Fraud Promise Without Intent to Perform (as against all Defendants) 2. Fraud Intentional Misrepresentation (as against all Defendants) 3. Fraud Negligent Misrepresentation (as against all Defendants) 4. Breach of Contract (as against Conquest) 5. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (as against Conquest) 6. Negligence (as against all Defendants) The causes of action stem from a home improvement agreement that Plaintiff and Defendants entered into on June 7, 2023. Plaintiff alleges that the initial agreed upon cost for the work was $267,750.00. (Complaint, ¶¶28-29.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that no work was to be paid to Defendants prior to completion. (Complaint, ¶26.) However, Defendants allegedly began to ask for payments immediately upon execution of the agreement, including a $39,000.00 deposit (Complaint, ¶¶30 and 37), $30,000.00 on July 24, 2023 for adjustments requested by a soil engineer (Complaint, ¶¶32 and 37), and another $50,000.00 on July 31, 2023. (Complaint, ¶37.) Plaintiff alleges that during a June 7, 2023 face-to-face meeting between Plaintiff and Defendant Korkunis, on behalf of Defendant Conquest Korkunis orally promised that if Defendants were hired, three trained work crews would be provided each day, no demand for progress payments would be made until specific portions of the project were completed, and that the job would be completed by September of 2023. (Complaint, ¶53.) Plaintiff alleges that work crews were held back deliberately (Complaint, ¶ 38), payments were demanded before progress had been made, (Complaint, ¶ 37) and the project remains uncompleted. (Complaint, ¶49.) Plaintiff then filed suit. The motion now before the Court is Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint. Defendants demur to the first, second, and third causes of action, and additionally argue that Korkunis should not be included in Plaintiffs first three causes of action. Plaintiff filed an opposition; no reply was filed. Meet Confer Before filing a demurrer&the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a).) Although the demurring party attaches emails demonstrating meet and confer efforts, there was no meeting telephonically nor in person. Therefore, the requirements of Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a) remain unsatisfied. However, per Code Civ. Proc. §430.41(a)(4), A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. Therefore, the Court ow turns its attention to the demurrer. B. DISCUSSION Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Analysis Defendants primary argument upon demurrer is that each of the first three causes of action are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action. As explained below, the Court disagrees and overrules the demurrer. 1. Fraud Causes of Action The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) Upon demurrer, Defendants contend Plaintiff has not alleged an intent to defraud on part of Defendants. On the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that exact intention. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in a face-to-face meeting on June 7, 2023 between Plaintiff and Korkunis who spoke on behalf of Conquest Korkunis orally promised that if Defendants were hired, three trained work crews would be provided each day, no demand for progress payments would be made until specific portions of the project were completed, and that the job would be completed by September of 2023. (Complaint, ¶53.) Plaintiff then alleges that work crews were held back deliberately (Complaint, ¶¶ 38, 55), payments were demanded before progress had been made, (Complaint, ¶¶ 37, 55) and the project remains uncompleted. (Complaint, ¶¶ 49, 55.) The Complaint makes clear that not only is the third element of intent sufficiently plead, but so is the first element of a false representation and the second element of scienter. Here, Plaintiff alleges specifically who said what and when, and that what was said later turned out to be false. The intent here was clear, to induce Plaintiff to hire Defendants and enter into the agreement with Defendants for the home improvement project. The fourth element of justifiable reliance is fulfilled because the Complaint shows that Plaintiff performed due diligence by taking bids from two other companies before selecting Defendants. (Complaint, ¶9.) Plaintiff relied on Defendants expertise because Plaintiff knew nothing about construction. (Complaint, ¶7.) With each element of fraud plead with the requisite particularity, the first, second, and third[1] causes of action survive demurrer, and the demurrer is overruled. 2. Korkunis Remains in the suit Defendants additionally make the contention that Korkunis should not be included in Plaintiffs first three causes of action because officers of corporation do not incur personal tort liability merely by reason of their official position. (Demurrer, 11:10-11.) In making such a contention, Defendants rely on several cases, including the Supreme Court of Californias Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24Cal.3d 773 (Wyatt). However, Defendants reliance is misplaced. Our Supreme Court was mindful in their holding and meticulous with their words. Wyatt involved a case where the plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations regarding advertisem*nts by a mortgage company. When plaintiffs approached the company about their supposed debtor friendly loans, further misrepresentations were made to induce plaintiffs into signing, plaintiffs signed, and only later found that the loans they agreed to were on much less favorable terms. (Wyatt, supra, at 779-781.) When the lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, the mortgage company appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that officers of a corporation are typically not rendered personally liable. The Wyatt Court pointed out that this is the general rule, however, directors and officers of a corporation may become liable if they directly ordered, authorized, or participated in tortious conduct. (Wyatt, supra, at 785.) That is what Plaintiff is alleging. This sentiment in Wyatt has been echoed in later cases including those cited by Plaintiff: PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1379 and Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 505 [Director status therefore neither immunizes a person from individual liability nor subjects him or her to vicarious liability.] and those cited by Defendants: People v. Pacific Landmark, LLC (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1213 and Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1090 (abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35). As the allegations against Conquest are sufficient, so are those against Korkunis. Therefore, the demurrer as to Korkunis individual liability is overruled. C. CONCLUSION The demurrer filed by Conquest General Building Contractors, Inc., and James Michael Korkunis is OVERRULED. Defendants have twenty days to answer the Complaint. [1] Intentional and negligent misrepresentation possess the same essential elements as Plaintiffs initial fraud claim, and the Court need not repeat its analysis.

Ruling

LILIT KHACHATURYAN VS CITY OF GLENDALE, ET AL.

Aug 16, 2024 |24GDCV00018

Case Number: 24GDCV00018 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 7 Date: 8/16/2024 Case No: 24 GDCV00018 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Khachaturyan v. City of Glendale, et al. DEMURRER MOTION TO STRIKE Moving Party: Defendant City of Glendale Responding Party: Plaintiff Lilit Khachaturyan (No Opposition) RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to second cause of action of Complaint Strike first and second counts of first cause of action of Complaint CAUSES OF ACTION: from (Form) Complaint 1) Premises Liability Count OneNegligence Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn Count ThreeDangerous Condition of Public Property 2) General Negligence SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Lilit Khachaturyan alleges that in March of 2023 plaintiff was traveling on Gallery Way in Glendale when a poorly maintained tree fell on her vehicle while plaintiff was in it, causing damage to the vehicle and injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiffs damages and injuries were the direct result of the negligent conduct of defendants City of Glendale and City of Los Angeles in owning, controlling and/or maintaining the tree. The file shows that on May 13, 2023 plaintiff filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of the complaint as to defendant City of Los Angeles only, which dismissal was entered as requested the same date. Moving defendant City of Glendale remains a defendant in the action. ANALYSIS: Demurrer Second Cause of ActionGeneral Negligence Defendant City of Glendale demurs to the second cause of action of the form complaint for general negligence. Defendant argues that the cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action because there is no statutory basis for the general negligence claim. Under Government Code § 815: Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person. This statute is recognized to have eliminated common law claims for negligence against a public entity; liability must be based on statute. See, e.g., Mikkelsen v. State of California (1976, 2nd Dist.) 59 Cal.App.3d 621, 626-628; Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013, 2nd Dist.) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850 (Although the complaint sounds in negligence, there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California.) The Tort Claims Act specifies that a public entity is not liable for tortious injury unless the liability is imposed by statute. Colome v. State Athletic Com. (1996 2nd Dist.) 47 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1454. It is held that when pleading negligence against a public entity, even where the negligence is that of the public entity directly, plaintiff must allege and identify the statute establishing the duty owed by the public entity. Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802. In Searcy, the court of appeal affirmed the trial courts order sustaining a demurrer on the ground a statutory duty had not been identified, holding: [I]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or enactment (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a), 815.6; Tolan v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, supra., 100 Cal.App.3d 980, 983; Morris v. State of California, supra., 89 Cal.App.3d 962, 964; Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [75 Cal.Rptr. 240]), and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. ( Susman v. City of Los Angeles, supra., 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) Duty cannot be alleged simply by stating defendant had a duty under the law; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. The facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged. (Id.; see also Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 67, 71 [336 P.2d 968].) Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment, the statute or enactment claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified. Searcy, at 802. The complaint here alleges that defendant City of Glendale is a public entity. [Complaint ¶ 5 (a)(4)]. The second cause of action does not identify or refer to any statute in connection with this cause of action. [Complaint ¶ GN-1]. The demurrer accordingly is sustained with leave to amend to permit plaintiff to identify the specific statute under which plaintiff intends to proceed. The City argues that the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend, arguing that dangerous condition of public property, not negligence, is the proper cause of action based on plaintiffs allegations, and that plaintiff has already brought a dangerous condition claim as part of the first cause of action. Plaintiff has failed to file timely opposition to this motion, so she has failed to meet plaintiffs burden of showing how the cause of action could be effectively amended. However, this is the original complaint in the matter, and it is held that in the case of an original complaint, plaintiff need not even request leave to amend: unless [an original complaint] shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constituted an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not. King v. Mortimer (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 153, 158, citations omitted. Here, it is not clear from the face of the complaint that the pleading could not be appropriately amended. The first cause of action, in fact, specifies several statutes on which liability of the City is alleged to be based. [Complaint ¶ Prem-L-5 (b)]. In addition, under the liberal rules of pleading, parties are permitted to plead duplicative, alternative, or even inconsistent causes of action. See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997, 2nd Dist.) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 177, 180. One opportunity to amend is permitted. Motion to Strike First Cause of ActionPremises Liability, Count OneNegligence Defendant City of Glendale seeks to strike from the complaint the first and second counts of the first cause of action for premises liability. Those counts are for negligence and willful failure to warn. Defendant argues that there is no statutory basis for plaintiffs allegations of negligence so that count one fails as a matter of law. The count itself does not refer to a statutory basis for liability, but the cause of action does allege, at paragraph Prem.L-5 (b), that the City is liable to plaintiff for other reasons and the reasons for their liability are, and goes on to state that those reasons include liability under CCP 1714(a), 2338, Government Code § 815.2 (a), 820 (a), 835, 840.2. [Complaint ¶ Prem.L-5 (b)]. Defendant argues again that dangerous condition of public property, not negligence, is the proper claim based on the allegations, and does not challenge the sufficiency of count three for dangerous condition of public property. As set forth above, the cause of action does refer to the Government Code section under which the public entity can be liable for a dangerous condition of public property, Government Code § 835, under which: Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (a) A public entity is liable for injury caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. Defendant City of Glendale does not dispute that the facts alleged are sufficient to allege liability under this statute. The motion to strike count one accordingly is denied. However, the court will permit plaintiff on amendment to allege in count one itself the specific statute or statutes under which count one is being pursued. First Cause of ActionPremises Liability, Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn Defendant City of Glendale argues that a claim for willful failure to warn comes from Civil Code section 846, which provides immunity to owners of real property when a claimant is injured using the property for recreational purposes. The form pleading states Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn [Civil Code section 846]. [Complaint ¶ Prem.L-3]. Civil Code section 846 provides, in pertinent part: An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in this section. Defendant argues that the law is settled and that this entire section does not apply to public entities. Defendant relies on Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 704-710, in which the California Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain a demurrer to a complaint brought against an irrigation district for the wrongful death of two teenaged girls who drowned in a canal owned by the district. The Court rejected an argument by the district that it was protected from liability under Civil Code section 846, reviewing the statutory language, legislative history, and case law, and held that the statutory provisions concerning recreational activities in connection with public entities, including Government Code sections 831.2, 831.4, and 831.8, negative the applicability of section 846 to public entities. Delta Farms, at 710. In response to the argument that public entities are protected by section 846, the Court stated, We hold that they are not. Id. This count, which is expressly based on Civil Code section 846, is improperly brought against defendant City of Glendale, a public entity, and the motion to strike this count is granted. The motion is granted with leave to amend for plaintiff to have one opportunity to state a count without reference to Civil Code section 846, and which specifies the statute or statutes upon which the count is based. RULING: [No Opposition] Defendant City of Glendales UNOPPOSED Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the ground the second cause of action for general negligence fails to allege a statutory basis for the cause of action as brought against defendant City of Glendale, which is alleged to be a public entity. Defendant City of Glendales UNOPPOSED Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint: Motion is DENIED as to count one for negligence of the first cause of action for premises liability, as statutory provisions are alleged at paragraph Prem.L-5 (b). If plaintiff would like to clarify the specific statute or statutes upon which plaintiff relies, plaintiff is permitted to do so on amendment. Motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second count for willful failure to warn on the ground the claim is stated to be brought under Civil Code section 846, which is held does not apply to public entities. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 710. Such a claim, if viable, must be brought under a statute which applies to moving defendant City of Glendale as a public entity. Ten days leave to amend, only as specified above, if possible. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP §§ 430.41 and 435.5 before any further demurrer or motion to strike may be filed. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 7 Date: 8/16/2024 Case No: 24 GDCV00018 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Khachaturyan v. City of Glendale, et al. DEMURRER MOTION TO STRIKE Moving Party: Defendant City of Glendale Responding Party: Plaintiff Lilit Khachaturyan (No Opposition) RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to second cause of action of Complaint Strike first and second counts of first cause of action of Complaint CAUSES OF ACTION: from (Form) Complaint 1) Premises Liability Count OneNegligence Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn Count ThreeDangerous Condition of Public Property 2) General Negligence SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Lilit Khachaturyan alleges that in March of 2023 plaintiff was traveling on Gallery Way in Glendale when a poorly maintained tree fell on her vehicle while plaintiff was in it, causing damage to the vehicle and injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiffs damages and injuries were the direct result of the negligent conduct of defendants City of Glendale and City of Los Angeles in owning, controlling and/or maintaining the tree. The file shows that on May 13, 2023 plaintiff filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of the complaint as to defendant City of Los Angeles only, which dismissal was entered as requested the same date. Moving defendant City of Glendale remains a defendant in the action. ANALYSIS: Demurrer Second Cause of ActionGeneral Negligence Defendant City of Glendale demurs to the second cause of action of the form complaint for general negligence. Defendant argues that the cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action because there is no statutory basis for the general negligence claim. Under Government Code § 815: Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person. This statute is recognized to have eliminated common law claims for negligence against a public entity; liability must be based on statute. See, e.g., Mikkelsen v. State of California (1976, 2nd Dist.) 59 Cal.App.3d 621, 626-628; Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013, 2nd Dist.) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850 (Although the complaint sounds in negligence, there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California.) The Tort Claims Act specifies that a public entity is not liable for tortious injury unless the liability is imposed by statute. Colome v. State Athletic Com. (1996 2nd Dist.) 47 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1454. It is held that when pleading negligence against a public entity, even where the negligence is that of the public entity directly, plaintiff must allege and identify the statute establishing the duty owed by the public entity. Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802. In Searcy, the court of appeal affirmed the trial courts order sustaining a demurrer on the ground a statutory duty had not been identified, holding: [I]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or enactment (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a), 815.6; Tolan v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, supra., 100 Cal.App.3d 980, 983; Morris v. State of California, supra., 89 Cal.App.3d 962, 964; Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [75 Cal.Rptr. 240]), and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. ( Susman v. City of Los Angeles, supra., 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) Duty cannot be alleged simply by stating defendant had a duty under the law; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. The facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged. (Id.; see also Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 67, 71 [336 P.2d 968].) Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment, the statute or enactment claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified. Searcy, at 802. The complaint here alleges that defendant City of Glendale is a public entity. [Complaint ¶ 5 (a)(4)]. The second cause of action does not identify or refer to any statute in connection with this cause of action. [Complaint ¶ GN-1]. The demurrer accordingly is sustained with leave to amend to permit plaintiff to identify the specific statute under which plaintiff intends to proceed. The City argues that the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend, arguing that dangerous condition of public property, not negligence, is the proper cause of action based on plaintiffs allegations, and that plaintiff has already brought a dangerous condition claim as part of the first cause of action. Plaintiff has failed to file timely opposition to this motion, so she has failed to meet plaintiffs burden of showing how the cause of action could be effectively amended. However, this is the original complaint in the matter, and it is held that in the case of an original complaint, plaintiff need not even request leave to amend: unless [an original complaint] shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constituted an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not. King v. Mortimer (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 153, 158, citations omitted. Here, it is not clear from the face of the complaint that the pleading could not be appropriately amended. The first cause of action, in fact, specifies several statutes on which liability of the City is alleged to be based. [Complaint ¶ Prem-L-5 (b)]. In addition, under the liberal rules of pleading, parties are permitted to plead duplicative, alternative, or even inconsistent causes of action. See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997, 2nd Dist.) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 177, 180. One opportunity to amend is permitted. Motion to Strike First Cause of ActionPremises Liability, Count OneNegligence Defendant City of Glendale seeks to strike from the complaint the first and second counts of the first cause of action for premises liability. Those counts are for negligence and willful failure to warn. Defendant argues that there is no statutory basis for plaintiffs allegations of negligence so that count one fails as a matter of law. The count itself does not refer to a statutory basis for liability, but the cause of action does allege, at paragraph Prem.L-5 (b), that the City is liable to plaintiff for other reasons and the reasons for their liability are, and goes on to state that those reasons include liability under CCP 1714(a), 2338, Government Code § 815.2 (a), 820 (a), 835, 840.2. [Complaint ¶ Prem.L-5 (b)]. Defendant argues again that dangerous condition of public property, not negligence, is the proper claim based on the allegations, and does not challenge the sufficiency of count three for dangerous condition of public property. As set forth above, the cause of action does refer to the Government Code section under which the public entity can be liable for a dangerous condition of public property, Government Code § 835, under which: Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (a) A public entity is liable for injury caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. Defendant City of Glendale does not dispute that the facts alleged are sufficient to allege liability under this statute. The motion to strike count one accordingly is denied. However, the court will permit plaintiff on amendment to allege in count one itself the specific statute or statutes under which count one is being pursued. First Cause of ActionPremises Liability, Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn Defendant City of Glendale argues that a claim for willful failure to warn comes from Civil Code section 846, which provides immunity to owners of real property when a claimant is injured using the property for recreational purposes. The form pleading states Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn [Civil Code section 846]. [Complaint ¶ Prem.L-3]. Civil Code section 846 provides, in pertinent part: An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in this section. Defendant argues that the law is settled and that this entire section does not apply to public entities. Defendant relies on Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 704-710, in which the California Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain a demurrer to a complaint brought against an irrigation district for the wrongful death of two teenaged girls who drowned in a canal owned by the district. The Court rejected an argument by the district that it was protected from liability under Civil Code section 846, reviewing the statutory language, legislative history, and case law, and held that the statutory provisions concerning recreational activities in connection with public entities, including Government Code sections 831.2, 831.4, and 831.8, negative the applicability of section 846 to public entities. Delta Farms, at 710. In response to the argument that public entities are protected by section 846, the Court stated, We hold that they are not. Id. This count, which is expressly based on Civil Code section 846, is improperly brought against defendant City of Glendale, a public entity, and the motion to strike this count is granted. The motion is granted with leave to amend for plaintiff to have one opportunity to state a count without reference to Civil Code section 846, and which specifies the statute or statutes upon which the count is based. RULING: [No Opposition] Defendant City of Glendales UNOPPOSED Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the ground the second cause of action for general negligence fails to allege a statutory basis for the cause of action as brought against defendant City of Glendale, which is alleged to be a public entity. Defendant City of Glendales UNOPPOSED Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint: Motion is DENIED as to count one for negligence of the first cause of action for premises liability, as statutory provisions are alleged at paragraph Prem.L-5 (b). If plaintiff would like to clarify the specific statute or statutes upon which plaintiff relies, plaintiff is permitted to do so on amendment. Motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second count for willful failure to warn on the ground the claim is stated to be brought under Civil Code section 846, which is held does not apply to public entities. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 710. Such a claim, if viable, must be brought under a statute which applies to moving defendant City of Glendale as a public entity. Ten days leave to amend, only as specified above, if possible. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP §§ 430.41 and 435.5 before any further demurrer or motion to strike may be filed. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative. TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 7 Date: 8/16/2024 Case No: 24 GDCV00018 Trial Date: None Set Case Name: Khachaturyan v. City of Glendale, et al. DEMURRER MOTION TO STRIKE Moving Party: Defendant City of Glendale Responding Party: Plaintiff Lilit Khachaturyan (No Opposition) RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to second cause of action of Complaint Strike first and second counts of first cause of action of Complaint CAUSES OF ACTION: from (Form) Complaint 1) Premises Liability Count OneNegligence Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn Count ThreeDangerous Condition of Public Property 2) General Negligence SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Lilit Khachaturyan alleges that in March of 2023 plaintiff was traveling on Gallery Way in Glendale when a poorly maintained tree fell on her vehicle while plaintiff was in it, causing damage to the vehicle and injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that plaintiffs damages and injuries were the direct result of the negligent conduct of defendants City of Glendale and City of Los Angeles in owning, controlling and/or maintaining the tree. The file shows that on May 13, 2023 plaintiff filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of the complaint as to defendant City of Los Angeles only, which dismissal was entered as requested the same date. Moving defendant City of Glendale remains a defendant in the action. ANALYSIS: Demurrer Second Cause of ActionGeneral Negligence Defendant City of Glendale demurs to the second cause of action of the form complaint for general negligence. Defendant argues that the cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action because there is no statutory basis for the general negligence claim. Under Government Code § 815: Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person. This statute is recognized to have eliminated common law claims for negligence against a public entity; liability must be based on statute. See, e.g., Mikkelsen v. State of California (1976, 2nd Dist.) 59 Cal.App.3d 621, 626-628; Torres v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013, 2nd Dist.) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850 (Although the complaint sounds in negligence, there is no common law tort liability for public entities in California.) The Tort Claims Act specifies that a public entity is not liable for tortious injury unless the liability is imposed by statute. Colome v. State Athletic Com. (1996 2nd Dist.) 47 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1454. It is held that when pleading negligence against a public entity, even where the negligence is that of the public entity directly, plaintiff must allege and identify the statute establishing the duty owed by the public entity. Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802. In Searcy, the court of appeal affirmed the trial courts order sustaining a demurrer on the ground a statutory duty had not been identified, holding: [I]n California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or enactment (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a), 815.6; Tolan v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, supra., 100 Cal.App.3d 980, 983; Morris v. State of California, supra., 89 Cal.App.3d 962, 964; Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [75 Cal.Rptr. 240]), and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty. ( Susman v. City of Los Angeles, supra., 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) Duty cannot be alleged simply by stating defendant had a duty under the law; that is a conclusion of law, not an allegation of fact. The facts showing the existence of the claimed duty must be alleged. (Id.; see also Rubinow v. County of San Bernardino (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 67, 71 [336 P.2d 968].) Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment, the statute or enactment claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified. Searcy, at 802. The complaint here alleges that defendant City of Glendale is a public entity. [Complaint ¶ 5 (a)(4)]. The second cause of action does not identify or refer to any statute in connection with this cause of action. [Complaint ¶ GN-1]. The demurrer accordingly is sustained with leave to amend to permit plaintiff to identify the specific statute under which plaintiff intends to proceed. The City argues that the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend, arguing that dangerous condition of public property, not negligence, is the proper cause of action based on plaintiffs allegations, and that plaintiff has already brought a dangerous condition claim as part of the first cause of action. Plaintiff has failed to file timely opposition to this motion, so she has failed to meet plaintiffs burden of showing how the cause of action could be effectively amended. However, this is the original complaint in the matter, and it is held that in the case of an original complaint, plaintiff need not even request leave to amend: unless [an original complaint] shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constituted an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not. King v. Mortimer (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 153, 158, citations omitted. Here, it is not clear from the face of the complaint that the pleading could not be appropriately amended. The first cause of action, in fact, specifies several statutes on which liability of the City is alleged to be based. [Complaint ¶ Prem-L-5 (b)]. In addition, under the liberal rules of pleading, parties are permitted to plead duplicative, alternative, or even inconsistent causes of action. See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997, 2nd Dist.) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 177, 180. One opportunity to amend is permitted. Motion to Strike First Cause of ActionPremises Liability, Count OneNegligence Defendant City of Glendale seeks to strike from the complaint the first and second counts of the first cause of action for premises liability. Those counts are for negligence and willful failure to warn. Defendant argues that there is no statutory basis for plaintiffs allegations of negligence so that count one fails as a matter of law. The count itself does not refer to a statutory basis for liability, but the cause of action does allege, at paragraph Prem.L-5 (b), that the City is liable to plaintiff for other reasons and the reasons for their liability are, and goes on to state that those reasons include liability under CCP 1714(a), 2338, Government Code § 815.2 (a), 820 (a), 835, 840.2. [Complaint ¶ Prem.L-5 (b)]. Defendant argues again that dangerous condition of public property, not negligence, is the proper claim based on the allegations, and does not challenge the sufficiency of count three for dangerous condition of public property. As set forth above, the cause of action does refer to the Government Code section under which the public entity can be liable for a dangerous condition of public property, Government Code § 835, under which: Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. (a) A public entity is liable for injury caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. Defendant City of Glendale does not dispute that the facts alleged are sufficient to allege liability under this statute. The motion to strike count one accordingly is denied. However, the court will permit plaintiff on amendment to allege in count one itself the specific statute or statutes under which count one is being pursued. First Cause of ActionPremises Liability, Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn Defendant City of Glendale argues that a claim for willful failure to warn comes from Civil Code section 846, which provides immunity to owners of real property when a claimant is injured using the property for recreational purposes. The form pleading states Count TwoWillful Failure to Warn [Civil Code section 846]. [Complaint ¶ Prem.L-3]. Civil Code section 846 provides, in pertinent part: An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in this section. Defendant argues that the law is settled and that this entire section does not apply to public entities. Defendant relies on Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 704-710, in which the California Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain a demurrer to a complaint brought against an irrigation district for the wrongful death of two teenaged girls who drowned in a canal owned by the district. The Court rejected an argument by the district that it was protected from liability under Civil Code section 846, reviewing the statutory language, legislative history, and case law, and held that the statutory provisions concerning recreational activities in connection with public entities, including Government Code sections 831.2, 831.4, and 831.8, negative the applicability of section 846 to public entities. Delta Farms, at 710. In response to the argument that public entities are protected by section 846, the Court stated, We hold that they are not. Id. This count, which is expressly based on Civil Code section 846, is improperly brought against defendant City of Glendale, a public entity, and the motion to strike this count is granted. The motion is granted with leave to amend for plaintiff to have one opportunity to state a count without reference to Civil Code section 846, and which specifies the statute or statutes upon which the count is based. RULING: [No Opposition] Defendant City of Glendales UNOPPOSED Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND on the ground the second cause of action for general negligence fails to allege a statutory basis for the cause of action as brought against defendant City of Glendale, which is alleged to be a public entity. Defendant City of Glendales UNOPPOSED Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint: Motion is DENIED as to count one for negligence of the first cause of action for premises liability, as statutory provisions are alleged at paragraph Prem.L-5 (b). If plaintiff would like to clarify the specific statute or statutes upon which plaintiff relies, plaintiff is permitted to do so on amendment. Motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the second count for willful failure to warn on the ground the claim is stated to be brought under Civil Code section 846, which is held does not apply to public entities. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 699, 710. Such a claim, if viable, must be brought under a statute which applies to moving defendant City of Glendale as a public entity. Ten days leave to amend, only as specified above, if possible. The parties are ordered to meet and confer in full compliance with CCP §§ 430.41 and 435.5 before any further demurrer or motion to strike may be filed. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

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